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Abstract
Malware continues to be a major cyber threat, despite the
tremendous effort that has been made to combat them. The
number of malware in the wild steadily increases over time,
meaning that we must resort to automated defense techniques.
This naturally calls for machine learning based malware de-
tection. However, machine learning is known to be vulner-
able to adversarial evasion attacks that manipulate a small
number of features to make classifiers wrongly recognize a
malware sample as a benign one. The state-of-the-art is that
there are no effective countermeasures against these attacks.
Inspired by the AICS’2019 Challenge, we systematize a num-
ber of principles for enhancing the robustness of neural net-
works against adversarial malware evasion attacks. Some of
these principles have been scattered in the literature, but oth-
ers are proposed in this paper for the first time. Under the
guidance of these principles, we propose a framework and an
accompanying training algorithm, which are then applied to
the AICS’2019 challenge. Our experimental results have been
submitted to the challenge organizer for evaluation.
1 Introduction
Malware remains a big threat to cyber security despite com-
munities’ tremendous countermeasure efforts. For example,
Symantec (Symantec 2018) reports seeing 355,419,881 new
malware variants in year 2015, 357,019,453 in year 2016,
and 669,974,865 in year 2017. Worse yet, there is an increas-
ing number of malware variants that attempted to undermine
anti-virus tools and indeed evaded many malware detection
systems (CISCO 2018).
In order to cope with the increasingly severe situation, we
have to resort to machine learning techniques for automat-
ing the detection of malware in the wild (Ye et al. 2017).
However, machine learning based techniques are vulnera-
ble to adversarial evasion attacks, by which an adaptive at-
tacker perturbs or manipulates malware samples into adver-
sarial samples that would be detected as benign rather than
malicious (see, for example, (B. Biggio and et al. 2013;
Al-Dujaili et al. 2018; Hou et al. 2018; Chen, Ye, and
Bourlai 2017)).1 The state-of-the-art is that there are many
1The term “adversarial example” is often used in the literature.
We instead propose using the term “adversarial sample” because it
is arguably more natural in the context of malware detection, for
which we already get used to terms like “benign sample” and “ma-
attacks, but the problem of effective defense is largely open.
This is indeed the context in which the AICS’2019 malware
classification challenge is proposed.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we
propose, to the best of our knowledge, the first systematic
framework that aims to enhance the robustness of malware
classifiers against adversarial evasion attacks. The frame-
work is designed under the guidance of a set of principles,
some of which are known but scattered in the literature (e.g.,
using an ensemble of classifiers), but others are explicitly
proposed for the first time, such as the following. We pro-
pose using the capability of the optimal white-box attack to
bound the capability of any `p (p ≥ 1) norm based gray-box
attack from above, and propose using semantics-preserving
representation learning for malware classification. Both the
principles and framework should be seen as a starting point
and systematically refined in the future.
Second, we apply the framework to address the AICS
2019 malware classification challenge. Among the 3,133
testing samples in 5 classes, our classifier predicts 2,245
samples in class ‘0’, 461 samples in class ‘1’, 162 samples
in class ‘2’, 176 samples in ‘3’, and 89 samples in class ‘4’.
Since we do not know the ground truth of the testing set,
which has yet to be announced by the challenge organizer,
we cannot tell the effectiveness of the framework at the time
for writing the present paper. Instead, we have submitted our
classification result to the challenge organizer.
Related Work
Since the present paper focuses on defense against adversar-
ial malware classification, we review existing studies in this
topic by emphasizing two complementary approaches: input
prepossessing and adversarial training.
Input Prepossessing Input prepossessing transforms the
input to a different representation with the aim to reduce the
degree of perturbation to the original input. For example,
Random Feature Nullification (RFN) randomly nullifies fea-
tures in the training and testing phases (Wang et al. 2017);
licious sample”. Corresponding to these two kinds of samples, an
adversarial sample is a malicious sample that would be misclassi-
fied as a benign one.
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hash transformation leverages a locality-preservation prop-
erty to reduce the degree of perturbation to the original in-
put (Li et al. 2018); DroidEye (Chen et al. 2018) quantizes
binary feature representation via count featurization.
Our framework uses binarization to reduce the degree of
perturbation, which is inspired by the idea of feature squeez-
ing in the context of image processing (Xu, Evans, and Qi
2017). This effectively reduces the perturbation space be-
cause there are now only two kinds of perturbations: flip-
ping from ‘1’ to ‘0’ or flipping ‘0’ to ‘1’. This means that
we effectively consider the number of perturbations but not
the ‘scale’ of perturbation (i.e., reducing the sensitivity of
classifiers to small degrees of perturbation).
Adversarial Training Adversarial training augments the
training data with adversarial samples to improve the robust-
ness of classifiers. This idea has been independently pro-
posed in different application settings, including (Goodfel-
low, Shlens, and Szegedy ; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Ben-
gio 2016b) and (Xu et al. 2014; Xu et al. 2013). In partic-
ular, it has been proposed to consider adversarial training
with the optimal attack, which in a sense corresponds to the
worst-case scenario and therefore could lead to classifiers
that are robust against the non-optimal attacks (Al-Dujaili
et al. 2018). The challenge is of course to find the optimal
attack. In our framework, we use this approach to regular-
ize our model and seek the optimal attack via the gradient
descent method.
2 Review on Adversarial Evasion Attacks
against Malware Classification
Basic Idea
Consider a classifier f : X → Y that takes an unperturbed
malware instance x ∈ X as input and correctly outputs its
label y ∈ Y . Given x that is to be classified, the adversarial
evasion attack problem is to manipulate or perturb x to an
adversarial malware sample x′ such that the malicious func-
tionality of x is preserved while satisfying:
f(x′) 6= f(x), (1)
s.t. xlb ≤ x′ ≤ xub (2)
||x′ − x|| ≤  (3)
where xlb (xub) is the element-wise lower (upper) bound of
feature vectors, the box-constraint Eq.(2) means that the ma-
nipulation or perturbation cannot violate the constraints im-
posed by the feature definitions and u ≤ v means that each
element of u is no greater than the corresponding element
in v, and || · || refers to a metrics of interest (e.g., `p norm
for some p ∈ {0, 2,∞}) and Eq.(3) says that perturbations
may be bounded by a given  in the norm. The perturbation
vector is δx = x′ − x.
In the present paper, we focus on classifiers f that are
learned as neural networks, F : X → Ro, which output
(softmax) the probability mass function over o classes or la-
bels. Since the constraint given by Eq.(1) is hard to formu-
late, researchers proposed considering two scenarios: in the
case of non-targeted attacks, maximize the cost of classify-
ing the x′ as y
max
x′
L(F(x′), y); (4)
in the case of targeted attacks, minimize L(F(x′), yt),
where yt (yt 6= y) is a target label given by the attacker.
Threat Model
As elaborated below, a threat model against malware clas-
sifiers is specified by what the attacker knows, what the at-
tacker can do, and how the attacker wages the attack.
What the attacker knows There are three kinds of mod-
els from this perspective. A black-box attacker knows noth-
ing about classifier f except what is implied by f ’s re-
sponses to the attacker’s queries. A white-box attacker
knows all kinds of information about f , including its model
parameters. A gray-box attacker knows an amount of infor-
mation about f that resides in between the preceding two
extremes. For example, the attacker may know the training
set or feature definitions.
What the attacker can do In evasion attacks, the at-
tacker only can manipulate the testing data, while obey-
ing some constraints. One constrain is to preserve the ma-
licious functionality of a malware. Although the attacker
can manipulate a malware sample by inserting, deleting,
and replacing features (Dang, Huang, and Chang 2017;
Anderson et al. 2017), a simplifying assumption is to con-
sider insertion only (i.e., flipping a feature value from ‘0’
to ‘1’ (B. Biggio and et al. 2013; Nedim rndic 2014;
Grosse et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2017; Rosenberg et al. 2017;
Chen, Hou, and Ye 2017; Al-Dujaili et al. 2018). The other
constraint is to maintain the relation between features. Us-
ing the ACIS’2019 malware classification challenge as an
example, we note that n-gram (uni-gram, bi-gram, and tri-
gram) features reflect sequences of Windows system API
calls. This means that when the attacker inserts an API call
into a malware sample, several features related to this API
call will need to be changed according to the definition of
n-gram features.
How the attacker wages the attack Researchers generate
adversarial malware samples using various machine learning
techniques such as genetic algorithms, reinforcement learn-
ing, generative networks, feed-forward neural networks, de-
cision trees, and Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Xu, Qi,
and Evans 2016; Anderson et al. 2017; Hu and Tan 2017;
B. Biggio and et al. 2013; Xu et al. 2014; Nedim rndic 2014;
Carlini and Wagner 2017). In order to generate adversar-
ial malware samples effectively and efficiently, attacks of-
ten leverage the gradients with respect to inputs of neural
network (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy ; Papernot et al.
2016).
3 Framework
Guiding Principles
The design of the framework is guided by a number of
principles. These principles are geared towards neural net-
work classifiers, which are chosen as our focus because deep
learning techniques are increasingly employed in malware
defense, but their vulnerability to adversarial evasion attacks
has yet to be tackled (Raff et al. 2017).
Principle 1: Knowing the enemy This principle says that
we should strive to extract useful information about the data
as much as we can. This kind of information will offer in-
sights into designing countermeasures. For example, we can
ask questions of the following kinds:
• Is the training set imbalanced? If the training set is not
balanced, various methods need to be considered for alle-
viating the imbalance issue. For example, the widely-used
oversampling is to expand the samples of the “minority”
classes via random and repetitive sampling (Buda, Maki,
and Mazurowski 2018).
• Are there sufficiently many samples? This issue is impor-
tant especially when there are a large number of features
and when neural networks are considered. One widely-
used method is data augmentation, which generates new
samples by making slight modifications on original sam-
ples (Lemley, Bazrafkan, and Corcoran 2017).
• Are there simple indicators of adversarial samples? If
there are simple indicators of adversarial samples, we can
possibly design tailored classifiers for them.
Principle 2: Bridging the gap between countermeasures
against gray-box attacks and countermeasures against
white-box attacks In gray-box attacks, the attacker knows
some information about the feature set and therefore can
train a surrogate classifier fˆ : X → Y from a training set
(where the realization of fˆ is a neural network Fˆ) and lever-
age the transferability from fˆ to f to generate adversarial
samples. Consider an input x for which a gray-box attacker
generates perturbations using
δˆx ∈ max
||δˆx||≤
L(Fˆ(x+ δˆx), y),
the change to the loss of f incurred by δˆx is
|∆L| =
∣∣∣L(F(x+ δˆx), y)− L(F(x), y)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ δˆx
0
OL(F(x+ δ), y)dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
OL(F(x+ tδˆx), y)>δˆxdt
∣∣∣∣
≤  sup
||δ||≤
‖OL(F(x+ δ))‖∗ ,
where “|| · ||∗” means the dual norm of || · ||. The preceding
observation indicates that corresponding to the same (and
potentially large) perturbation upper bound , the loss in-
curred by gray-box attacks is upper bounded by the loss in-
curred by white-box attacks. This suggests us to focus on
the robustness of classifier f against the optimal white-box
attack because it accommodates the worst-case scenario. It
is worth mentioning that our observation, which applies to
an arbitrary perturbation upper bound , enhances an ear-
lier insight that holds for a small perturbation upper bound 
(Demontis et al. 2018).
Principle 3: Using ensemble of classifiers rather than a
single one (i.e., not putting all eggs in one basket) This
is suggested by the observation that no single classifier may
be effective against all kinds of evasions. Worse yet, we may
not know the kinds of evasions the attacker uses to generate
adversarial samples. Therefore, we propose using ensemble
learning to enhance the robustness of neural networks based
malware classifiers.
An ensemble can be constructed by many methods (e.g.,
bagging, boosting or using multiple classifiers). The gener-
alization error of an ensemble decreases significantly with
the ensemble size when the base classifiers are effective and
mutual independent (Hoeffding 1963). For example, ran-
dom subspace (Ho 1998) is seemingly particularly suitable
for formulating malware classifier ensembles because the
dimension of malware feature vectors is often very high,
which indicates a high vulnerability of malware classifiers
to adversarial samples (Simon-Gabriel et al. 2018).
Since the output of a neural network (with softmax) is
the probability mass function over the classes in question,
the final prediction result is produced according to these
probabilities. Formally, an ensemble fen : X → Y con-
tains a set of neural network classifiers {fi}li=1, namely
fen = {fi : X → Y; (1 ≤ i ≤ l)}. Given a testing sample
x, each classifier fi defines a conditional probability on pre-
dicting y : P (y|x, fi). We treat the base classifier equally,
and the voting method is
P (y|x) = 1
l
l∑
i=1
P (y|x, fi), (5)
where P (y|x) is the probability that the ensemble predicts
x as the label y.
Principle 4: Using input transformation to reduce the
degree of perturbation caused by evasion manipulation
In the context of malware classification, input transforma-
tion techniques, such as adversarial feature selection (Zhang
et al. 2016) and random feature nullification (Wang et al.
2017), can reduce the degree of perturbation in adversar-
ial samples so as to improve the robustness of classifiers. In
typical applications, the defender does not know what kinds
of evasion manipulations are used by the attacker to gen-
erate adversarial samples, including the number of features
that are manipulated by the attacker. Therefore, we propose
considering a spectrum of evasion manipulations, from ma-
nipulating a few features (measured by, for example, the `0
norm) to manipulating a large number of features (but the
magnitude of these manipulations may be small and there-
fore measured for example by the `∞ norm). Moreover, we
may give higher weights to the transformation techniques
that can simultaneously reduce the degrees of perturbations
in terms of the `∞ norm, `0 norm, or `2 norm. This sug-
gests us to propose using the binarization technique: When
the feature value of the ith feature, denoted by xi, is smaller
than a threshold Θi, we binarize xi to 0; otherwise, we bi-
narize xi to 1. The threshold Θi may be set as the median
value of the ith feature. This input transformation reduces
the perturbation space to two kinds: flipping ‘0’ to ‘1’ and
flipping ‘1’ to ‘0’.
Principle 5: Using adversarial training to “inject” im-
munity into classifiers Adversarial training (also known
as proactive training (Xu et al. 2014)) incorporates some
adversarial samples into the training set. Various kinds of
heuristic training strategies have been proposed (see, e.g.,
(Grosse et al. 2017; Szegedy et al. 2013; Xu et al. 2014;
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy ; Kurakin, Goodfellow,
and Bengio 2016a). However, these strategies typically deal
with some specific evasion methods and therefore are not
known to effective against other evasion methods. Inspired
by robust optimization, (Madry et al. 2017) propose solving
the saddle point problem so as to improve the robustness of
neural networks against a wide range of adversarial samples.
This strategy has been adapted to the context of malware
classification in (Al-Dujaili et al. 2018).
The preceding discussion suggests us to train neural net-
works that can accommodate the optimal attack and the un-
perturbed examples on distribution D:
min
θ
E(x,y)∈D
[
max
δx≤
L(F(x+ δx), y) + L(F(x), y)
]
,
(6)
where L(·, ·) is the cross-entropy and θ denotes the param-
eters of neural network F (as the realization of fi). A key
issue is how to deal with the optimal attack. (Madry et al.
2017) showed that the projected gradient descent (PGD) can
solve the inner maximum problem effectively for calculating
the first-order adversarial samples. Inspired by this insight,
we leverage gradient descent on the negative cross-entropy
to generate adversarial samples. In order to avoid local min-
ima, we can randomly repeat several times for each point
and pick the point minimizing the negative cross-entropy as
the initial point.
Principle 6: Using semantics-preserving representations
Adversarial malware samples must assure that a manipu-
lated sample is still a malware (i.e., preserving the mali-
cious functionality of the original malware sample). This
suggests us to strive to learn neural network models that are
sensitive to malware semantics, but not the perturbations be-
cause the latter must preserve the malicious functionality of
the original malware. Specifically, we propose using denois-
ing autoencoder to learn semantics-preserving representa-
tions because they can make neural network less sensitive to
perturbations. A denoising autoencoder ae = d ◦ e unifies
two components: an encoder e : X → H that maps an in-
put M(x) to a latent representation r ∈ H and a decoder
d : H → X that reconstructs x from r, where the H is the
latent representation space and M refers to some operations
applied to x (e.g., adding Gaussian noises to x). (Vincent
et al. 2010) showed that the lower bound of the mutual in-
formation between x and r is maximized when the recon-
struction error is minimized. In the case of Gaussian noise
 ∼ N (0, σ2) and reconstruction loss
E∼N(0,σ2) ‖ae(x+ )− x)‖22 , (7)
(Alain and Bengio 2014) showed that the optimal ae∗(x) is
ae∗(x) =
E [p(x− )(x− )]
E [p(x− )] , (8)
where p(·) is the probability density function. Eq.(8) says
that representations of a well-trained denoising autoencoder
are insensitive to x because of the weighted average from the
neighbourhood of x, which is reminiscent of the attention
mechanism (Luong, Pham, and Manning 2015).
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Figure 1: Illustration of neural network for classification.
Blue dashed box contains the learned encoder, which and the
output layer comprise the learned neural network classifier.
The model parameters are tuned to minimize the supervised
loss function.
Figure 1 depicts how the learned encoder is leveraged for
classification, where the encoder structure is the same as de-
scribed in (Vincent et al. 2010). Two examples of noise are:
• Salt-and-pepper noise: A fraction α of the elements of
original sample x are randomly selected, and then set their
values as their respective minimum or maximum (i.e., ef-
fectively flipping ‘1’ to ‘0’ or flipping ‘0’ to ‘1’).
• Perturbation δx: A perturbation δx is added to x such that
classifier fi misclassifies adversarial sample x′ = x+ δx.
Note that when an input transformation technique mentioned
above is used together with a denoising autoencoder, the for-
mer should be applied first and the latter is applied to the
transformed input.
Given a mini-batch of N training samples
x1,x2, · · · ,xN , the empirical risk of a denoising au-
toencoder is
Lae =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
‖ae(M(xi))− xi‖22 + ‖ae(x′i)− xi‖22
]
,
(9)
where M(·) denotes adding salt-and-pepper noise on x and
x′i is the adversarial sample generated via adversarial train-
ing.
Turning principles into a framework
The principles discussed above guide us to propose a frame-
work for adversarial malware classification, which is high-
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Figure 2: Overview of the proposed malware classification framework. In the training phase, an ensemble of l neural network
classifiers are trained, with each classifier hardened by three countermeasures (i.e., input transformation, semantics-preserving,
and adversarial training using gradient descent on the transformed data). In the testing phase, the label of a sample is determined
according to the result of voting by the l classifiers.
lighted in Figure 2 and elaborated below. Specifically, we
need to examine whether or not the input has some issues
(e.g., imbalanced data) that need to be coped with via an ap-
propriate prepossessing (according to Principle 1). We pro-
pose using an ensemble fen of classifiers {fi}li=1 (according
to Principle 3), which are trained from random subspace of
the original feature space. Each classifier fi is hardened by
three countermeasures: input transformation via binarization
(according to Principle 4); adversarial training models on the
optimal attacks using gradient descent (green arrows in Fig-
ure 2, according to Principle 2 and Principle 5); semantics-
preservation is achieved via an encoder and a decoder (ac-
cording to Principle 6). In order to attain adversarial training
and at the same time semantics-preservation, we learn clas-
sifier fi via block coordinate descent to optimize different
components of the model.
Putting the pieces together, we obtain Algorithm 1 for
training individual classifiers. The training procedure con-
sists of the following steps. (i) Given a training set (X,Y ),
we randomly select a ratio Λ of sub-features to the fea-
ture set, and then transform X into X via the binariza-
tion technique discussed above. (ii) We sample a mini-batch
{xi, yi}Ni=1 from (X,Y ), and calculate the adversarial sam-
ples x′i for xi ∈ {xi}Ni=1 according to Lines 5-11 in Algo-
rithm 1). (iii) We pass the {M(xi)}Ni=1 and {x′i}Ni=1 through
the denoising autoencoder to compute the reconstruction
loss with respect to the target {xi}Ni=1 via Eq.(9), and up-
date the parameters of the denoising autoencoder. (iv) We
pass the {xi}Ni=1 and {x′i}Ni=1 together through the neural
networks to compute the classification error with respect to
Algorithm 1: Training classifier fi
Input: Training set (X,Y ), maximum training epoch
Nepoch, mini-batch size N , and the number of
repeat times K.
1 Cope with issues like imbalanced input;
2 Select a ratio Λ of sub-features to the feature set;
3 Transform input X to X via binarization;
4 for epoch = 0 to Nepoch do
5 Sample a mini-batch {xi, yi}Ni=1 from the (X,Y );
6 for repeat = 0 to K do
7 Apply slight salt-and-pepper noise to {xi}Ni=1;
8 Calculate perturbations {δrepeatxi }Ni=1 for
manipulating sample {x′i}Ni=1;
9 Project {x′i}Ni=1 into the binary space;
10 end
11 Select the best perturbation δxi from δ
repeat
xi where
0 ≤ repeat < K for xi (1 ≤ i ≤ N) so as to
minimize the negative cross-entropy;
12 Calculate the reconstruction loss via Eq.(9);
13 Backpropagate the loss and update the denoising
autoencoder parameters;
14 Calculate the adversarial training loss via Eq.(6);
15 Backpropagate the loss and update classifier
parameters;
16 end
the ground truth label {yi}Ni=1 via Eq.(6), and update the
parameters of the classifier via backpropagation. Note that
Steps (ii)-(iv) are performed in a loop. The output of the
training algorithm is a neural network classifier.
4 Experiment: Applying the Framework to
the AICS’2019 Challenge
The AICS’2019 Challenge
The challenge is in the context of adversarial malware clas-
sification (i.e., labeling the class to which a malware sam-
ple belongs or multiclass classification), namely construct-
ing evasion-resistant, machine learning based malware clas-
sifiers. The dataset, including both the training set and the
testing set, consists of Windows malware samples (or in-
stances), each of which belongs to exactly one of the fol-
lowing five classes: Virus, Worm, Trojan, Packed malware,
and AdWare.
For each sample, the features are collected by the chal-
lenge organizer via dynamic analysis, including the Win-
dows API calls and further processed unigram, bigram, and
trigram API calls. The feature names (e.g., API calls) and
the class labels are “obfuscated” by the challenge organizer
as integers, while noting the obfuscation preserves the map-
ping between the features and the integers representation of
them. For example, three API calls are represented by three
unique integers, say 101, 102, and 103; then, a trigram API
call “101;102;103” means a sequence of API calls 101, 102,
and 103. In total there are 106,428 features.
The testing set consists of adversarial samples and non-
adversarial samples (i.e., unperturbed malware samples).
Adversarial samples are generated by a variety of pertur-
bation methods, which are not known to the participating
teams. However, the ground truth labels of the testing sam-
ples are not given to the participating teams. This means that
the participating teams cannot calculate the accuracy of their
detectors by themselves. Instead, they need to submit their
classification results (i.e., labels on the samples in the test-
ing set) to the challenge organizer, who will calculate the
classification accuracy of each participating team.
Basic Analysis
As discussed in Principle 1 of the framework, our basic anal-
ysis aims to identify some basic characteristics that should
be taken into consideration when adapting Algorithm 1 to
this specific case study.
Is the training set imbalanced? The training set consists
of 12,536 instances, and the testing set consists of 3,133 in-
stances. The training set contains 8,678 instances in class
‘0’, 1,883 instances in class ‘1’, 771 instances in class ‘2’,
692 instances in class ‘3’, and 512 instances in class ‘4’. Fig-
ure 3 plots the histogram of the instances in the training set
according to the given labels of malware class (i.e., the five
malware classes that have been obfuscated as integers ‘0’,
‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’). We can calculate the maximum ratio be-
tween the number of instances in different classes is 16.95,
indicating that the training set is highly imbalanced.
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Figure 3: Histogram of the training set in malware classes.
In order to cope with the imbalance in the training set,
we use the Oversampling method to replicate randomly se-
lected samples from a class with a small number of sam-
ples. The replication process ends until the number of sam-
ples is comparable to that of the largest class (i.e., the class
with the largest number of samples), where “comparable”
is measured by a predefined ratio. In order to see the effect
of this ratio, we use a 5-fold cross validation on the train-
ing set to investigate the impact of this ratio. The classifier
consists of neural networks with two fully-connected lay-
ers (each layer having 160 neurons with the ReLU activa-
tion function), which are optimized via Adam (Kingma and
Ba 2014) with epochs 50, mini-batch size 128, learning rate
0.001. The model is selected when achieving the best Macro
F1 score on the validation set.
Table 1: Accuracy (%) and Macro F1 score (%) are reported
with a 95% confidence interval with respect to the ratio pa-
rameter (%), where ‘—’ means learning a classifier using the
original training dataset.
Ratio (%) Accuracy (%) Macro F1 (%)
— 93.20±1.04 85.52±1.12
30 92.86±0.75 85.47±1.04
40 92.38±1.00 84.87±1.07
50 92.21±0.60 84.87±1.00
60 92.48±1.12 84.62±1.01
Table 1 shows that the Macro F1 score decreases as the
oversampling ratio of minority classes increases. In order to
make each mini-batch of training samples contain samples
from all classes, which would be critical in muticlass classi-
fication, our experience suggests us to select the 30% ratio.
Are there sufficiently many samples? Machine learning,
especially deep learning, models need to be trained with
a “large” number of samples, where “large” is relative to
the number of features. In the challenge dataset, the train-
ing set contains 12,536 samples while noting that there are
106,428 features, which may lead to overfitting. To cope
with this, we note that adversarial training is a data augmen-
tation method (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy ), which
can be leveraged to regularize the resulting classifiers.
Are there simple indicators of adversarial samples? In
the first testing set published by the challenge organizer, we
see negative values for some features. These negative values
would indicate that they are adversarial samples. In the re-
vised testing set provided by the challenge organizer, there
are no negative feature values, meaning that there are no
simple ways to tell whether a sample is adversarial or not. In
spite of this, we can speculate the count of perturbed features
by comparing the number of nonzero entries corresponding
to the samples in the training set to their counterparts in the
testing set. It is important because the attack success rate
increases with the number of perturbed features.
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Figure 4: Histogram of the normalized frequency of the
number of nonzero entries corresponding to samples in the
training set and their counterparts in the testing set. The
dashed line represents the mean value.
Figure 4 shows the normalized frequency of the number
of nonzero entries corresponding to the samples in the train-
ing set and their counterparts in the testing set. We observe
that their normalized frequencies are similar except that
some testing samples have more nonzero entries (> 1200).
Their mean values are much smaller than the input dimen-
sion (106, 428), suggesting that the average number of per-
turbed features may be small.
Classification Result
For adversarial training, the gradient descent with respect
to the transformed input iterates 55 times via Adam op-
timizer (Kingma and Ba 2014) with learning rate 0.01.
The perturbed input is projected into the range [0, 1] and
rounded into binary space (i.e., binarization as discussed in
the framework). Since we do not have access to the malware
samples, we cannot tell whether a feature perturbation pre-
serves the malware functionality or not. We train 10 neural
network based classifiers to formulate an ensemble, includ-
ing 6 classifiers using the input transformation, adversarial
training, and semantics-preservation techniques discussed in
the framework, and the other 4 classifiers using the input
transformation and adversarial training techniques because
some samples may be perturbed without preserving the ma-
licious functionality in the training. The ratio for random
subspace method is set as Λ = 0.5. Each classifier has two
fully-connected hidden layers (each layer having neurons
160), uses the ELU activation function, and is optimized by
Adam with epochs 100, mini-batch size 128, and learning
rate 0.001. The classification result has been submitted to
AICS 2019 organizer for evaluation.
5 Conclusion
We have systematized six principles for enhancing the ro-
bustness of neural network classifiers against adversarial
evasion attacks in the setting of malware classification.
These principles guided us to design a framework, which
leads to a concrete training algorithm. We applied the train-
ing algorithm to the AICS’2019 challenge, and submitted
the classification result to the challenge organizer for evalu-
ating the effectiveness of our framework.
The problem of adversarial malware detection has not re-
ceived the due amount of attention. We hope this paper will
inspire more research into this important problem. Future
research problems are abundant, such as: extending and re-
fining the principles against evasion attacks, seeking princi-
ples to enhance robustness of adversarial malware detection
against poisoning attacks, designing more systematic frame-
works and more robust techniques against adversarial mal-
ware.
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